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My main concern in this paper is to provide an account of the aspectuality of 
propositional attitudes. After having made the negative point that aspectuality cannot 
be accounted for in purely semantic terms, I shall maintain that what accounts for 
aspectuality are phenomenal modes of presentation. The fundamental difference 
between my modes of presentation and those employed in the several variants of the 
standard account of aspectuality is that while the latter are properties (taken to be true) 
of the objects which are involved in the content, my modes of presentation are properties 
of the subject’s experience of the objects and in this sense qualify as “subjective”. 
My thesis is that only phenomenal modes of presentation are suited to account for 
aspectuality because they incorporate that peculiar way of appearing of the object to 
the subject which explains whether or not he takes different attitudes towards contents 
which concern the same object. That modes of presentation have to play this role is an 
unquestioned point in the debate. That in order to do it they need to have a phenomenal 
nature is what I shall try to argue for here. 
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My main concern in this paper is the phenomenon of aspectuality. 
Aspectuality and directionality (or aboutness) are the two distinguishing 
features of intentionality: intentional mental states are always directed 
towards something and the way in which they are so directed is always 
perspectival in the sense that what a given mental state is about is always 
given in a certain way (“under a given aspect”), where this way is crucial to 
account for the motivational role which the mental states the subject enjoys 
exert in her (verbal and non verbal) behavior. Even though the phenomenon 
of aspectuality manifests itself in every kind of mental state, here I shall deal 
with it only in connection with the attitudes, that is states such as believing/
desiring/fearing, both in their propositional form (S desires that p) and in their 
objectual form (S desires x)1. The question I shall address is how aspectuality 
has to be accounted for as far as attitudes are concerned.
A widespread tendency in the philosophical literature has been to equate the 
aspectuality of the mental states with the opacity of the sentences used in the 
attitude attributions and to account for the former in terms of what accounts 
for the latter. This strategy, which was inaugurated by Frege’s account of 
propositional attitudes in the last part of Über Sinn und Bedeutung and which 
was very congenial to the (explanatory) priority thesis of the linguistic content 
over the mental content which characterized the “linguistic turn” in analytic 
philosophy, has been subsequently endorsed even by people who have rejected 
Frege’s analysis in terms of senses and even by people who have rejected 
the priority thesis characteristic of the linguistic turn. We can distinguish 
different varieties of this general strategy of accounting for aspectuality in 
terms of modes of presentation: (i) the Fregean variety which treats modes 
of presentation as constituents of the proposition expressed; (ii) the hidden-
indexical variety which treats them as unarticulated constituents of the 
proposition expressed; (iii) the overt-indexical variety according to which 
modes of presentations are constituents of quasi-singular propositions; (iv) 
1.
The standard 
account of the 
phenomenon of 
aspectuality
* I have presented versions of this paper at the 2010 ESPP in Bochum and Essen, at the 
International Conference “The Nature of Belief – The Ontology of Doxastic Attitudes” in 
2010 at the University of Southern Denmark in Odense, and at the 2010 SIFA Meeting in 
Padua. I would like to thank audiences on all of these occasions for their observations 
and comments. Special thanks to Alberto Voltolini who has commented on several 
drafts of this paper and with whom I have discussed many aspects of my proposal. 
1 Since my main concern here is in the propositional form I shall make use of the label 
“propositional attitudes” which is standard within the literature. 
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the neo-Russellian strategy in which modes of presentation do not enter into 
the semantic content of a belief report but in what is pragmatically conveyed 
by an utterance of it. Notwithstanding the differences, what all these strategies 
share is the assumption that the aspectuality of propositional attitudes has to 
be accounted for in semantic or in semantic plus pragmatic terms.
This assumption has of course a strong intuitive appeal: as a matter of 
fact both propositional attitudes and their linguistic reports manifest the 
phenomenon of “perspectivalness” (just to use a general label to cover both 
the mental and the linguistic case). If one can account for perspectivalness at 
the linguistic level in a given way (i.e. in semantic or semantic plus pragmatic 
terms), why not claiming that the same kind of explanation can be provided 
for the mental level? 
The idea that it is not possible to account for perspectivalness at the mental 
level in purely semantic terms because the phenomenon of aspectuality 
does not coincide with the phenomenon of opacity of attitude reports has 
been defended by many people in the more or less recent literature in the 
philosophy of mind2. Here I shall side with those people and in the first part 
of my paper I shall provide some arguments in support of the thesis that any 
attempt to explain aspectuality in terms of opacity is doomed to fail. 
This point about aspectuality matches a parallel point about directionality or 
aboutness. Many people nowadays maintain that it is not possible to explain 
“mental aboutness” in terms of “linguistic aboutness” because the former is 
original and non derivative. I accept this point even though I will not argue for 
it here. What I shall try to defend in the first part of this paper is the parallel 
point about aspectuality. I think that even though the two points can go 
together3, they can be argued for on independent grounds.
In the second part of the paper, after having made the negative point that 
aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms, I shall address 
the question as to what positively accounts for it. The gist of my proposal 
is that what accounts for aspectuality are phenomenal modes of presentation. 
To anticipate, let me explain why I think that we need them. My reason is 
the following: to account for aspectuality one needs to account for the way 
in which the object is given to the subject. The question is how modes of 
presentation have to be conceived in order to account for what we shall call the 
“to-aspect”. My idea is that only phenomenal modes of presentation are suited 
in so far as they incorporate that peculiar way of appearing of the object to the 
2 See e.g. Crane 2001.
3 An example of the conjoined strategy is provided by Searle who accounts for the 
original aboutness of conscious mental states in terms of their intrinsic aspectuality. 
I shall come back to Searle’s position at the very end of this paper.
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subject which explains whether or not he takes different attitudes towards 
contents which concern the same object. That modes of presentation have to 
play this role is an unquestioned point in the debate. That in order to do it they 
need to have a phenomenal nature is what I shall try to argue for here. 
The fundamental difference between my modes of presentation and those 
employed in the several variants of the standard account of aspectuality is 
that while the latter are properties (taken to be true) of the objects which 
are involved in the content, my modes of presentation are properties of the 
subject’s experience of the objects and in this sense qualify as “subjective”. 
By contrast, “traditional” modes of presentation qualify as “objective” in the 
sense that they are not properties of the subject’s experience. The notion of 
mode of presentation is indeed ambiguous between these two readings. In 
order to avoid confusion I shall use the label “manners of presentation” for 
the subjective reading and “modes of presentation” for the objective reading4. 
I shall conclude my paper by addressing some objections to my positive 
account of aspectuality.
Before arguing for the first thesis that aspectuality cannot be accounted 
for in purely semantic terms let me say a word about the repercussions of 
my present suggestion on one central debate in the philosophy of mind 
which deals with the question of the relation between consciousness and 
intentionality. That my suggestion has repercussions on that debate is obvious 
in so far as it claims that aspectuality, that is one of the two distinguishing 
features of intentionality, has to be explained in terms of phenomenal modes 
of presentation. To defend this stance is to reject the idea that intentionality 
can be wholly accounted for independently of consciousness and so to 
reject “intentionalism” in the debate concerning the relationship between 
intentionality and consciousness5. Many people nowadays defend the thesis 
that there is an explanatory priority of intentionality on consciousness. The 
general strategy those people have adopted, in the attempt to provide a 
naturalistic account of the mind, has been that of divide et impera which enjoins 
to separate intentionality from consciousness, to provide a naturalistic account 
of intentionality and then to naturalize consciousness itself by analyzing it in 
terms of intentionality without remainder. We can distinguish two main ways 
of pursuing the goal of grounding consciousness in intentionality. One way is 
provided by so called “Higher-Order Theories of consciousness” which analyze 
conscious states in terms of higher-order states that represent them: to be 
4 The distinction between manners and modes of presentation has been 
acknowledged for example by Chalmers, See e.g. Chalmers 2004.
5 I shall here use “intentionalism” as a label for the general strategy of grounding 
consciousness in intentionality.
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conscious for a state, according to this picture, is for the state to be represented 
in a special way by a higher order representation6. The other way, which is 
more popular, tries to analyze phenomenal conscious states as certain sorts of 
first-order intentional states, advocating in this way “representationalism” that 
is: the thesis that the phenomenal properties of a mental state are identical, or 
equivalent (and therefore reducible) to certain representational properties of 
the state7. Intentionalism has been challenged in recent times by people who 
have argued that consciousness itself plays a crucial role in the constitution 
of intentionality. Some have defended the strong claim that all intentionality 
is grounded on consciousness, others the more modest claim that not all 
intentionality is independent of consciousness and that there is a crucial sort 
of intentional content which is grounded in and derive from the phenomenal 
character of mental states8.
Having drawn the main theoretical articulations of this debate let me clarify 
which position my proposal occupies within it. In so far as I want to defend 
the claim that one of the two distinguishing features of intentionality 
(namely the aspectuality of the mental states) has to be accounted for in 
terms of phenomenal characters I reject the intentionalist strategy. Rejecting 
intentionalism places me in the anti-intentionalist side of the debate but here 
I need to make some qualifications. In general those who enter this debate do 
not take care of distinguishing between directionality and aspectuality and, as 
a consequence, they do not raise the question as to whether it is directionality 
or aspectuality or both or neither to depend on consciousness. I think it is 
important to introduce this further question because in my view the range of 
available options is wider than the participants in the debate tend to assume. 
Not only can one be an intentionalist or an anti-intentionalist tout court 
(either of the strong or of the weak variety); one can be an intentionalist/an 
anti-intentionalist as regards directionality (in so far as he claims/he denies 
that no appeal to consciousness is needed to account for directionality) and 
at the same time he can either endorse or reject the parallel point about 
aspectuality. In this paper I shall not raise the question as to whether aboutness 
or directionality depends on consciousness, but the parallel question about 
aspectuality. In answering this question I shall defend a qualified form of anti-
intentionalism claiming that a feature of intentionality, namely, aspectuality, 
6 Among the proponents of Higher-Order Theories of consciousness there are 
Carruthers 2000, Lycan 2004, Rosenthal 2002. 
7 The representationalist position is very well exemplified by Dretske 1995 and Tye 2002. For 
this characterization of “representationalism” see Chalmers 2004, p. 4.
8 A representative of the strong position is Searle 1992. Among the representatives of the 
weaker position there are Horgan and Tienson 2002, McGinn 1988, Siewert 1998.
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cannot be accounted for independently of consciousness. From this nothing 
follows as far as directionality is concerned. As things stand, directionality 
could be explained wholly independently of consciousness9.
My aim in this part is to make the negative point that aspectuality is not the 
same as opacity and, consequently, that it cannot be accounted for in terms of 
what accounts for the latter. I shall start by a minor consideration. The way in 
which the phenomenon of opacity is defined does not seem to be sufficiently 
general to cover all mental states. Let me explain. Opacity is defined in terms 
of failure of substitution salva veritate, but this feature does not seem to be 
applicable to mental states having a non propositional content for example, 
because the notion of truth-preservation has no application there in so far as 
objective contents are neither true nor false10. It goes without saying that this 
consideration does not prove that opacity is not the same as aspectuality. At 
most it shows that the characterization provided of the linguistic phenomenon 
is not sufficiently general to capture the mental phenomenon. The more 
substantial point we have to consider is whether it is possible to account for 
aspectuality in terms of what accounts for opacity. The general tendency 
within the literature has been to account for opacity in semantic (or in 
semantic plus pragmatic) terms, that is, in terms of modes of presentation 
taken as articulated or unarticulated constituents of the proposition expressed 
or communicated. Modes of presentation have been conceived in very 
different ways: as senses, intensions, guises, characters. My claim is that modes 
of presentation do not account for aspectuality because they do not capture 
the way in which the object is given to the subject who is entertaining a given 
mental state. Many people have criticized the so called standard account 
of the attitudes on the ground that it does not succeed in individuating in a 
2.
Why aspectuality 
cannot be 
accounted for 
in purely 
semantic terms
9 In Sacchi and Voltolini, submitted, aboutness has been treated as a relation of constituency 
holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, the intentional 
object. In the account we provided consciousness does not play any role. Our position 
therefore is not compatible with the anti-intentionalist idea that mental aboutness is 
grounded in consciousness. 
10 One could claim that every objectual content is equivalent to a propositional content 
and therefore that truth-preservation applies there as well. For example, one could claim 
that Petrarca’s desire for Laura is a desire to meet and kiss Laura and so a state with a 
propositional content. Nonetheless the idea that states with objectual content can be 
reduced to states with propositional content has been strongly criticized within the 
literature. As far as perceptual states are concerned, for example, those who, like Dretske, 
1995, defend the plausibility of a “non-epistemic seeing”, reject the idea that any objectual 
seeing is reducible to a propositional seeing (I can see an object without categorizing it and 
so without seeing that the object is so and so). For a defense of the irreducibility claim as far 
as emotions are concerned see Crane 2001.
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sufficiently fine-grained way the modes of thinking of the objects which are 
required to account for aspectuality. I side with those people in criticizing the 
standard account. Yet I do not claim that we need more fine-grained modes 
of presentation. That they would not help is a point which has been stressed, 
among other people, by Kent Bach in discussing Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle11. 
Given that our interest here is in the failure of substitution salva veritate I shall 
formulate Kripke’s puzzle along the lines of Frege’s cases. 
Here is how the case goes. A subject, Peter, has had interactions with a 
politician he knows under the name ‘Paderewski’ and interactions with a 
pianist he knows under the same name. Unbeknownst to Peter, Paderewski 
the politician is the same person as Paderewski the pianist. Peter, who does 
not know this, believes that they are two different guys who happen to have 
the same name. As regards Paderewski the pianist Peter believes that he has 
musical talent (he has attended several concerts of Paderewski and in those 
occasions he has very much appreciated his skill); as regards Paderewski 
the politician Peter is agnostic about his having musical talent. So we have a 
situation in which 
1. Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent (as regards the 
pianist he knows under the name ‘Paderewski’) is true, and nonetheless
2. Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent (as regards the 
politician he knows under the name ‘Paderewski’) is false.
The problem which this case raises is how to account for Peter’s situation.
A standard reply to this puzzle is to claim that the that-clauses used in the 
attributions do not completely specify the content of Peter’s two beliefs and 
that, in order to provide a more accurate formulation of his beliefs, one just 
needs to insert additional material (more verbiage) by adding for example 
“Paderewski, the politician” and “Paderewski, the musician”.
According to Bach the idea that it is possible to account for this puzzle by introducing 
more concepts in the subject’s modes of presentation of the object, so that in one 
case Peter would believe that Paderewski under the concept PIANIST has musical 
talent and in the other he would neither believe nor disbelieve that Paderewski 
under the concept POLITICIAN has musical talent, does not make the problem go 
away. In order to show how the problem would present itself one step further, Bach 
proposes the following variation of the original puzzle. Suppose that Peter hears a 
recording of Paderewski playing Rachmaninov in Carnegie Hall and that he likes 
what he hears. Then he hears a recording of Paderewski playing with a jazz combo at 
the Apollo Theatre and this time he hates what he hears. He does not realize he has 
heard the same pianist twice. But here, Bach claims, it won’t do any good to say that 
Peter disbelieves that Paderewski, the pianist, has musical talent, because we could 
11 See Bach 1997.
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also have truly said that he believes that Paderewski, the pianist, has musical talent. 
We could make the that-clauses more precise by adding “Paderewski, the classical 
pianist” and “Paderewski, the jazz pianist” but this ploy, he claims, won’t ultimately 
work either in so far as one could imagine a situation in which the enriched that-
clauses could be used to generate further versions of the puzzle.
Bach’s point is that it is not possible to individuate belief contents in terms of 
purely conceptual specifications. The train of thought behind his argument 
seems to be the following: if conceptual specifications were sufficient to 
individuate the mental states a subject enjoys in a given context, then it 
shouldn’t be possible, by sticking to those specifications, to generate a new 
version of the puzzle at a subsequent level. But this is possible. Therefore 
purely conceptual specifications are not sufficient for the individuation. 
According to Bach, the lesson to draw is that “that-clauses” are not content 
clauses in the sense that they do not specify what the subject believes and 
therefore there is no reason to suppose that there is a unique thing that he 
both believes and disbelieves. I think that his argument legitimates a weaker 
conclusion, namely that belief reports do not specify beliefs fully. What is left 
out or in any case not fully determinate is precisely the peculiar way in which 
the object is given to the subject in the two cases. Whether this implies that 
belief reports do not specify belief contents very much depends on which 
ontology of the propositional attitudes one adopts. If one thinks that the 
attitudes are two-places relations, then differences in modes of presentation 
determine differences in content, but if one conceives of them as three-
places relations (between a subject, a content and a mode of presentation/
way of thinking), then differences in modes of presentation do not determine 
differences in content. In what follows I shall stick to the more general moral, 
which I deem less theoretically laden.
The claim that the that-clauses used in the attribution may not fully specify 
the content of the mental states of the subject (or, more generally, the subject’s 
mental states) is not new in the literature. As far as thought’s contents are 
concerned a case in point is provided by Brian Loar. In Phenomenal Intentionality 
as the Basis of Mental Content, for example, Loar claims in a vein very similar to 
that of Bach’s: “Mental content is individuated more fine-grainedly than the 
interpersonally shared ‘oblique’ content of certain that-clauses… That-clauses 
as they are standardly used apparently capture too little information, even on 
oblique interpretations, and that information is not of the right sort… They are 
not especially psychologically informative” (Loar 2003, pp. 229-230)12.
12 In Loar’s view what matters for the individuation of the mental (or as he says 
“psychological”) content of a subject’s thought is not “what her thoughts represent as 
it were impersonally, but also how they represent things to her” (Loar 2003, p. 229). 
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If Bach and Loar defend the claim that the that-clauses used in the attribution 
may not fully specify the contents of the mental states of the subject by 
considering the case of propositional attitudes, most of those who have 
endorsed that claim have taken into account the case of perceptual experience. 
That the content of a perceptual experience cannot be fully specified in purely 
linguistic terms is a point widely acknowledged. People who endorse this 
claim ground it on the idea that the way in which the object is perceptually 
given is different and irreducible to a conceptual mode of presentation. The 
idea that manner of perception are irreducible to (Fregean-like) modes of 
presentation is explicit in Peacocke’s work. In Perceptual Content, for example, 
Peacocke claims that “these manners of perception constitute a genuine level 
of content in their own right” and goes on distinguishing that level from both 
the level of the objects in the world which are perceived and the level of modes 
of presentation which can enter thought-contents. This irreducibility has to 
do with the irreducibility of what we can call “the level of experience” to the 
conceptual level. As far as perceptual demonstrative thoughts are concerned, 
Peacocke acknowledges that they are partly individuated by elements at the 
level of experience; for he claims that what individuates a demonstrative 
mode of presentation such as that distance is not only the perceptual mode 
of presentation of the line and the concept DISTANCE but also the manner 
in which the distance is perceived. But even though he acknowledges this 
point he deems phenomenology to be out of place as far as the individuation 
of propositional attitudes are concerned: “The distinctness of the content of 
perception at the level of manners from the contents of the attitudes seems 
ultimately to derive from the different demands made by the two very different 
notions which individuate the two kinds of content. Individuation of the content 
of perception is answerable to matters of phenomenology in the first instance, while 
the content of attitudes is answerable to matters of epistemic possibility – and these 
two notions can come apart” (Peacocke 1989, p. 314. Emphasis mine). Peacocke 
exemplifies the standard stance in philosophy of mind according to which 
matters of phenomenology are relevant for the individuation of so called 
qualitative states such as sensations and feelings but not for the individuation 
of propositional attitudes. 
According to my proposal, phenomenal characters play a fundament role in 
accounting for the aspectuality of the mental (not just as regards qualitative 
states but as regards every kind of mental state) for they are precisely the 
phenomenal characters that are responsible for the subject’s taking or not 
taking the same attitude towards contents which concern the same object 
and which ascribe the same properties to it. My thesis is that what we need to 
account for aspectuality are manners of presentation, i.e. modes of presentation 
3.
The positive 
point: grounding 
aspectuality on
 the phenomenal
character of the act
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which are individuated in terms of phenomenal characters. So, to come back 
to Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle, what in my view accounts for the difference 
in Peter’s two beliefs is a difference in the phenomenal characters of his two 
beliefs. When Peter thinks of Paderewski (qua pianist) in entertaining the 
belief that Paderewski has musical talent he is phenomenally affected by 
Paderewski in a way which is different from the way in which Paderewski 
affects him when he thinks about him (qua politician). In order to highlight 
the difference between the nature of my modes of presentation (manners 
of presentation) and that of those that have traditionally been employed 
in the philosophical literature on propositional attitudes we must use the 
contrast subjective/objective. Manners of presentation are subjective: they 
are constituted by properties of the subject’s “experience” of the objects and 
properties thought about. Modes of presentations are objective: they are 
constituted by properties the thinking subject takes what he is thinking about 
to possess.
In this sense my proposal differs radically from that of those who reject the 
idea that it is always possible to individuate modes of presentation in purely 
conceptual terms and that introduce non-conceptual modes of presentation 
within the picture to cope with the above mentioned problems13. Both 
conceptual and non conceptual modes of presentation are objective in 
the sense that they are not properties of the subject’s experience. What 
is new in my picture is precisely the idea that we need subjective modes 
of presentation to account for aspectuality because objective modes 
of presentation, even if implemented with a non-conceptual level, are 
not fine-grained enough to account for aspectuality. A subject could 
not recognize that it is one and the same object that is given to him in 
two different occasions even though both the conceptual and the non-
conceptual specifications of the object in the two cases were identical. This 
would be a case in which the subject’s experience of the object has different 
properties even though there is no difference at the objective level of what 
is represented14.
My proposal commits therefore to the claim that not just in perceiving 
an object but also in thinking about it there is something it is like to be 
presented with the object, whatever the attitudinal mode of the act turns 
out to be. That there is something it is like to perceive an object (to see a 
13 An advocate of this position is, for example, Récanati. See e.g. Récanati 1993. 
14 Of course a representationalist could claim that even the subjective properties of 
experience are part of the content of the mental states. But even the representationalist 
would need to distinguish them from the other properties of the content reintroducing in 
this way that distinction between subjective and objective presentations which I claim has 
to be acknowledged in order to account for aspectuality.
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ripe tomato, to hear a melody, to taste a cherry) is a point that everyone 
is willing to concede. In my view the same holds for thinking. That that is 
so is something which everyone can ascertain on the ground of her own 
experience (provided her theoretical biases do not prevent her to make this 
acknowledgement). And this turns out to be true not only of a very peculiar 
subclass of thoughts (such as, for example, perceptual demonstrative ones) 
but of every thought. To acknowledge this point is of course not enough to 
ground the claim that phenomenal characters play a fundamental role in 
accounting for aspectuality. What does ground this claim then?
My answer is that they are the phenomenal characters what ultimately 
account for the subject’s taking or not taking different attitudes towards 
contents which ascribe the same properties to the same object. Let me 
explain. Whether a given subject takes the same or a different attitude 
is not explained by the fact that in the two cases he entertains the same 
or a different set of conceptual specifications of the object. The concepts 
of the object which get mobilized in the two cases could be the same and 
nonetheless the subject could take different attitudes. What explains the 
subject’s taking the same or a different attitude is the fact that he takes/
does not take that it is one and the same object that is presented to him in the 
two cases. The fact that he uses the same or a different set of conceptual 
specifications of the object does not explain this fact. One could put this 
point by saying that sameness or difference in conceptual specifications 
do not explain the subject’s taking the thing he is thinking about to be 
the same as itself or not. Objective modes of presentation seem therefore 
to be inadequate to play the role they have been introduced to play. 
This is a point which an author such as Ruth Millikan, for example, has 
stressed in a series of works15. In Perceptual Content and the Fregean Myth, 
for example, she attacks Frege by saying that he has done something like 
“confusing sameness in the vehicle of representation with a representation 
of sameness” (Millikan 1991, p. 439), generating in this way the illusion 
that sameness in meaning immediately translates into sameness in 
intermediaries and then into sameness in cognitive mechanics and 
conversely. Against Frege, she claims that the iteration of a thought via the 
same mode of presentation cannot, simply as such, necessitate an act of 
grasping the sameness of the contents involved. I deem Millikan’s criticism 
to the point. Yet, against her, I do not think that sameness or difference 
have to be “represented” in order for the rational mind to respond to them. 
Sameness or difference, or better presumed sameness or difference, are, so 
to say, to be “felt”. When a person on two different occasions is thinking of 
15 See e.g. Millikan 1991, 1993.
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what he takes to be the same object (whatever conceptual specifications 
he uses in the two cases) his two episodes of thinking have the same 
phenomenal character. By contrast, when two episodes of thinking have 
different phenomenal characters this shows that the subject does not take 
them to be about the same object. 
Let me now clarify how phenomenal characters have to be conceived. 
The phenomenological account which I promote commits itself to the 
claim that every (occurrent16) mental state has a phenomenal aspect: so 
not only sensations and feelings but also propositional attitudes have a 
phenomenology17. What is worth stressing here is that even granting that 
propositional attitudes have a phenomenology as far as their attitudinal 
mode is concerned (i.e. even granting that there is something it is like to 
desire that p and that it is different from what it is like to fear that p for 
example), it cannot be that dimension what accounts for aspectuality. The 
reason is simple. Let us consider Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle (or Frege’s 
Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzle). In both cases we are dealing with attitudes 
having the same attitudinal mode. Given that the attitudinal mode is the 
same it cannot be differences in the phenomenological mode which explain 
the difference in the way the object is “presented to S” in the two cases. The 
difference has to be explained in terms of the way in which the objects and 
properties S is thinking about are given to her. We therefore have to say that 
they are the contents themselves which are responsible for the differences 
in the phenomenal characters of the subject’s experience in the two cases. So 
the phenomenologically based account of the attitudes commits itself to the 
claim that contents themselves contribute to the phenomenology in the sense that 
they figure in our phenomenological domain when we consciously entertain 
them in a given attitudinal mode18.
Does this mean that contents have associated with them distinct qualia 
or raw feels? Well, many people simply identify phenomenal characters 
with raw feels. If one makes this identification he can hardly see how 
something devoid of sensible properties (as contents as opposed to sentences 
16 The rational for this qualification will become clear at the end where I shall address 
some objections to my proposal. To anticipate the point, let me say that if the 
aspectuality of the mental is explained in terms of phenomenal characters then, given 
that only conscious states can have phenomenal characters and that only occurrent 
states can be conscious, it follows that what I am accounting for is the aspectuality of 
occurrent mental states. How the case of dispositional mental states can be dealt with is 
a point which I shall address at the end.
17 I shall not provide any argument for this claim here even though at the end I shall 
briefly present some lines of arguments which could be put forward in its defense.
18 For a defense of this point see McCulloch 2003; Strawson 1994, 2004.
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seem to be) could be associated with a phenomenal character19. But it is a 
mistake to make that identification: the phenomenal characters associated 
with sense experience are but a variety of phenomenal characters. Many 
people in the recent literature have acknowledged this point and have 
introduced the distinction between sensuous phenomenology and non-
sensuous phenomenology20. The idea is that both a sense experience and 
a propositional attitude may be associated with a distinctive phenomenal 
character which is of the sensuous variety in the first case and of the 
non-sensuous variety in the other case. Once the idea of a non-sensuous 
phenomenology has been introduced, a further distinction has to be 
drawn between the non-sensuous qualities associated with the attitudinal 
mode of the act (non- sensuous act phenomenology) and those associated 
with the subject’s experience of the content of the acts (non-sensuous 
content phenomenology). They are the latter which are needed in order to 
characterize the aspectuality of propositional attitudes, because aspectuality 
has to do with the way in which the content is (experientially) given to the 
subject and the content is something devoid of sensible properties. The non-
sensuous phenomenal character of S’s belief that p is the way in which that p 
affects S when S entertains the belief.
But what relation is there between the (non-sensuous) phenomenal character 
and the content? As far as this issue is concerned one can take one of two 
stances: one can claim that (i) the phenomenal character is a constituent (and 
therefore a determiner) of content; or that (ii) the phenomenal character 
does not determine content but the way in which it affects the subject’s act 
of entertaining it. Position (i) is very well exemplified by McGinn in his 1988 
paper Consciousness and Content where he talks about the Janus-faced character 
of conscious content having both an outward looking face (a face which points 
to the external world) and an inner looking face (a face which points to the 
subject). In his view, these faces or aspects (the of-aspect and the to-aspect) are 
19 It goes without saying that if one’s model of phenomenal character is based on 
sensory experience one would hardly attribute phenomenal characters to one’s acts of 
entertaining contents. For in the latter case there aren’t any of those sensuous aspects 
which are present in sense experience. Undoubtedly, what it is like to taste a ripe 
tomato, or to kiss one’s lover, or to smell a scented flower is incomparably different and 
richer. And yet this should not prevent one to recognize that there are other kinds of 
qualitative features of a non-sensuous kind. 
20 The distinction between sensory and non-sensory qualia is acknowledged by 
several authors: Crane 2001, for example, draws it (he uses “qualia” or “qualitative 
features” for sensory properties and “phenomenal character” in the broader sense 
of what it is like to be in a mental state); Kriegel 2008 also draws it and distinguishes 
between phenomenal character as a kind of sensuous quality and phenomenal 
character as whatever property the explanatorily gap concerns. 
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a function of each other. I don’t want to follow the first stance which McGinn 
exemplifies. My reasons for not adhering to (i) is that in my view it ends up 
subjectivizing contents in a way which makes it impossible for two subjects 
to entertain one and the same content. Let me explain. If the to-aspect (the 
phenomenal character) is a determinant (however partial) of the content a 
given subject entertains, then given that the to-aspect involves reference to 
the subject who is entertaining the content, it follows that no two different 
subjects could entertain one and the same content. This seems to me a very 
undesirable consequence. I think it is possible to account for subjectivity 
without making contents themselves subjective. That’s why I think that 
option (ii) is preferable. According to it, to be Janus-faced are not the contents 
but the subject’s conscious acts of entertaining them. To adhere to (ii) is to 
locate subjectivity on the act-hand side of the divide; a mental act has both 
representational features and phenomenal features: the representational 
features of the act account for the of-aspect (the directionality of the mental 
act); the phenomenal features account for the to-aspect (the aspectuality of 
the mental act). In my view, the tendency to locate the subjective aspects 
of our mental states in the content of the state, i.e. on the “objective side” 
of the so called subjective/objective divide, is a mistake made by all forms 
of “representationalism”. According to representationalism phenomenal 
properties are a special kind of representational properties. The strong variety 
of this doctrine defends the idea of the reducibility of phenomenal properties 
to representational proprieties by claiming that the former are identical or 
equivalent to the latter. But even those varieties which rejects reducibility21, 
and McGinn’s position is one of those, make in my view the same mistake of 
thinking that the phenomenal properties contribute to what is represented. 
Let us now consider how the relation between the phenomenal character 
and the phenomenal mode of the act has to be conceived. We can here 
distinguish two possible ways of treating phenomenal characters: either as 
independent from the phenomenal mode of the act (so that, for example, 
a given content, that p say, may affect the subject in a given way no matter 
whether that p is perceived or thought about for example), or as dependent 
from the phenomenal mode of the act (so that the way in which that p 
affects the subjects depends on the attitudinal mode under which that p is 
entertained). The alternative which I deem more congenial to my proposal is 
the former. Let me explain why I think so. If I am right in claiming that they 
are the phenomenal characters of the subject’s mental states that account 
for whether the subject takes what he is thinking about to be the same or 
21 For a discussion of the various forms of representationalism, reductive and non 
reductive, strong and weak, pure and impure, see Chalmers 2004.
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different in different mental episodes, then since it is patently possible for a 
subject to make an assumption of identity/difference towards the “intentional 
object” of mental states of different attitudinal modes (i.e. he can deem that 
it is one and the same object that is both perceived and thought about or 
desired or feared or whatever), it ought to be possible for states in different 
attitudinal modes to have the same phenomenal character. But this requires 
that phenomenal characters are independent from the attitudinal modes of 
the act. This follows from the explanatory role which manners of presentation 
are claimed to play in my picture. Of course if one questions my assumption 
my line of argument collapses, but in order to do it one has to show that other 
candidates are better suited to play that explanatory role. Even though there 
are many arguments against the suitability of objective modes of presentation 
to play the mode of presentation role, I know of no argument to the same effect 
which is directed against manners of presentation. Given that it is in “the very 
nature” of manners of presentation to account for the way in which the object 
is (experientially) given to the subject and given that this is precisely what 
one needs in order to account for aspectuality, I do not see which arguments 
the objector could device against them. What he could do is to question their 
existence. But pending that demonstration, and the onus probandi is on the part 
of the objector, we can go on undisturbed. 
But if phenomenal characters can be common in mental acts with different 
intentional modes and if phenomenal characters are properties of the act, the 
question immediately arises as to which act they are properties of. A plausible 
answer is to claim that any mental act, whatever its intentional mode may 
be, is actually “grounded” in a more basic act which can be conceived as a 
presentation of the object to the subject22. 
An issue on which I prefer to stay neutral here is the way in which the claim 
according to which the phenomenal characters do not determine contents 
but the way in which they affect the subject’s act of entertaining them is to 
be articulated. I just signal two ways in which one could develop that claim 
which could be called the adverbialist and the non-adverbialist way as regards 
manners of presentation23. 
According to the “adverbialist way” 
22 This kind of answer seems to be in line with some of Brentano’s thesis about the role 
of Vorstellungen. Brentano (in Brentano 1874) distinguishes three classes of mental 
phenomena or acts: representations (Vorstellungen) – including ideas, images, thoughts 
and sensations –, judgments and emotions. After having made this distinction he 
presents in ch. 7 appendix IX a theory of judgment according to which all judgments 
are based on presentations. 
23 This qualification is important not even the former qualifies as adverbialist as regards 
the analysis of the attitudes in so far as it provides a relational account of them.
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S’s believing that p (that Hesperus is F) is for S to believe-Hesperus-wise that p 
and
S’s believing that q (that Phosphorus is F) is for S to believe-Phosphorus-wise that p.
According to the “non-adverbialist” way
S’s believing that p (that Hesperus is F) is for S to believe in a Hesperescent way that p
and
S’s believing that q (that Hesperus is F) is for S to believe in a Phosphorescent 
way that p. 
Even though these two ways seem to be notational variants, the kind of 
metaphysics of the attitudes on which they are based is different. The 
adverbialist way conceives of propositional attitudes as two-places relations 
(between an individual and a proposition); the non-adverbialist way conceives 
of propositional attitudes as three-places relations (between an individual, a 
way of appearing – sort of non-sensuous looking – and a content). 
I shall conclude this paper by considering some objections to my suggested 
phenomenologically oriented account of aspectuality. The first objection 
goes like this: “Your suggested account of the aspectuality of propositional 
attitudes cannot be right because propositional attitudes do not have any 
phenomenology, only sensations have phenomenal or qualitative aspects”24.  
As I said, one of the principal resistances to the idea that propositional attitudes 
have phenomenal characters comes from the identification of phenomenal 
characters with sensuous qualia. To reject that identification is a fundamental 
step in accepting the idea that phenomenology extends far further than the 
domain of the sensible. So which arguments could be provided in support of 
the idea that propositional attitudes have a phenomenology (of a non-sensuous 
kind)? I shall here present two arguments. The former, which is a revision of 
what is called in the literature “the argument from subjective identification”, 
goes like this25. First step: we have an immediate access to some aspects of the 
state we are in (we can know immediately not just the intentional mode of a 
propositional attitude – whether it is a desire or a belief or a fear for example – 
but also how it presents things to us); second step: we can have immediate access 
only to aspects which are endowed with a phenomenal dimension; conclusion: 
4.
Addressing 
some objections 
24 An author such as Dretske for example could make this objection. See e.g. Dretske 1995.
25 Among the proponents of the original version see Boghossian 1989 and BonJour 
1998. The name of the argument has to do with the proponents’ rejection of the 
functionalist account of our subjective identification of the mental states we are in. 
Arguments against functionalist accounts of our self-ascription of mental states can 
be found in Goldman 1993.
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both the intentional mode of a propositional attitude and the aspect under which 
the content is given to us must have a phenomenal dimension26.
Let us now consider the second argument which is grounded on the intuition 
that mental states of different attitudinal modes may exhibit a high degree of 
phenomenological continuity. The basic idea behind this argument is that when 
we move from a state of non-conceptual perception (or pre-perceptual awareness 
of properties: a sensation of cat-shapedness, a sensation of carpet-shapedness) 
to one of non-conceptual perception (I see a cat on the carpet), and from there 
to propositional perception (I see that there is a cat on the carpet) and thinking 
(I think that there is a cat on the carpet) we keep our focus on the object and do 
not experience any qualitative “break” or “jump”. To deny that propositional 
attitudes have a phenomenology would amount to claiming that when the 
subject moves to the level of thought he ceases to be phenomenally conscious. 
But this is contrary to the “phenomenological continuity intuitions”27. 
Even though these arguments may not support the strong claim that propositional 
attitudes are essentially phenomenal they seems to support the weaker claim that 
phenomenology does not disappear at that level. That’s enough for my present 
purpose. To defend my phenomenologically based account of the aspectuality of the 
attitudes I do not need essentialism but the more modest claim according to which 
propositional attitudes present a general dependency on states with phenomenal 
characters. Let us now consider another objection. Here what the objector rises is a 
point about the range of application of my proposal: “Since only occurrent mental 
states can have phenomenal characters, how to account for the aspectuality of 
dispositional mental states?”. I think that there are at least two ways in which one 
could accommodate the case of dispositional mental states. The most radical way is to 
deny that there is any aspectuality at that level or, less radically, to claim that there is 
only “as-if aspectuality”. The other way is to resort to the distinction between original 
vs. non original and to provide an explanation of the aspectuality of dispositional 
mental states along the lines in which Searle, for example, accounts for the non 
original intentionality of non-conscious mental states28. One could therefore say that 
26 In its original version the argument maintains that we have an immediate access to (and 
therefore that we know immediately) not only the attitudinal aspect of the state we are in but also 
its content. This version of the argument has been challenged on the ground that, in so far as it is 
possible to provide a non phenomenological account of our immediate self-knowledge of content, 
the second step of the argument has to be rejected and so the conclusion does not go through. 
Even though some authors (see e.g. Pitt 2004) have tried to defend the second step against the 
objection that it is possible to provide a functionalist account of our immediate self-knowledge of 
content, I do not want to follow that line. Given that in my picture the phenomenal character is 
not an aspect of the content of the act I do not need to defend the idea that the best account of our 
immediate self-knowledge of content is a phenomenological one. 
27 For a presentation and discussion of this argument see Klausen 2008.
28 See Searle, 1992.
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what makes a non-occurrent belief of S the belief that Hesperus is beautiful and not 
the belief that Phosphorus is beautiful is this: if the belief were conscious then it would 
have a Hesperescent phenomenal character and not a Phosphorescent phenomenal 
character. 
I shall conclude by making a comment on Searle’s thesis that only conscious 
intentionality has genuine aspectuality. In The Rediscovery of the Mind Searle 
tries to defend the thesis that intentionality depends upon consciousness 
and makes use of aspectuality to make this point. The general outline of 
his argument is the following: no genuine intentionality without intrinsic 
aspectuality; no intrinsic aspectuality without consciousness; therefore 
no genuine intentionality without consciousness. We can distinguish two 
dependence claims in Searle’s argument: the dependence of intentionality 
on aspectuality; the dependence of aspectuality on consciousness. The two 
claims are independent and can be held separately. I agree with Searle’s second 
claim and in my paper I have tried to give some substance to it. In commenting 
Searle’s proposal in the context of the discussion as to whether intentionality is 
dependent on consciousness Kriegel says: “According to Searle, when x becomes 
aware of her belief… her belief is endowed, in and of itself, with an aspectual 
shape… But what is it about the conscious thought that endows it with this 
intrinsic aspectual shape? Searle has nothing to say about that” (Kriegel 2003, 
p. 280). Well, I think that this criticism is to the point. What I have tried to 
do in my paper is precisely to show how an answer to that question could be 
provided.
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